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THE PRESENCE AND ABSENCE OF 
LEGAL MIND:  
A COMMENT ON DUNCAN KENNEDY’S 
THREE GLOBALIZATIONS 
CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS* 
Throughout The Birth of Biopolitics, Michel Foucault chides himself for 
engaging in “schematic” exposition, by which he meant (by his standards) 
unforgivably “abstract” or “bald” or “sketchy” or “stark” generalization.1 
Foucault’s historical method demanded an intense skepticism toward 
universals—“primary, original, and already given object[s],” for example, “the 
sovereign, sovereignty, the people, subjects, the state, civil society” and so on—
from which, he alleged, conventional historical analysis was prone to derive the 
meaning of concrete practices.2 Foucault desired to start with these practices not 
in order to use them to interrogate the universals (“the historicist reduction”) 
but to determine their historical meaning in the absence of the “grid of 
intelligibility” that the universals supplied: “Let’s suppose that madness does 
not exist . . . what can history make of these different events and practices which 
are apparently organized around something that is supposed to be madness?”3 
It was galling, then, that the compressed time of a lecture frequently required of 
Foucault the expository equivalent of the economist’s clichéd a priori: “assume 
a can opener.” 
Duncan Kennedy’s Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, 1850–
20004 (Three Globalizations) brings The Birth of Biopolitics to mind for two 
reasons. First, like Foucault, Kennedy engages in schematic exposition.5 The 
difference is that Kennedy does not apologize for doing so: rather than 
contradict his method, schematic exposition is entailed by it. Second, 
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 1.  MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 
1978–79 39, 105–107, 133, 168, 194–197, 293 (2010).  
 2.  Id. at 2. 
 3.  Id. at 3. 
 4.  Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW 
LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 63 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos 
eds., 2006). 
 5.  Here I must part company with Aya Gruber, who commends Three Globalizations for its 
“thick description.” See Aya Gruber, Duncan Kennedy’s Third Globalization, Criminal Law, and the 
Spectacle, 3 COMP. L. REV. 1 (2012). But perhaps this is simply a difference in perspective between a 
historian and a lawyer. 
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notwithstanding this difference in method, Foucault may be able to help readers 
understand the puzzle of Kennedy’s third globalization: that is, its incoherence, 
or its lack (when compared to the first and second globalizations) of any 
“discernible large integrating concept.”6 
I pursue both of these matters below. But first I feel it necessary to situate 
myself vis-à-vis discussions of Three Globalizations that have already taken 
place. Kennedy’s essay, which was published in 2006,7 was used to kick-start a 
workshop on contemporary legal thought  held in October 2011 at the 
University of Colorado Law School and organized by Pierre Schlag and Justin 
Desautels-Stein.8 A second workshop, which then concentrated exclusively on 
contemporary legal thought, was held at Harvard Law School in June 2013, 
some of the fruits of which appear in this issue of Law and Contemporary 
Problems. As it happens, I was involved in neither workshop. This article was 
solicited late in 2013 by Justin Desautels-Stein after one of the Harvard 
participants dropped out, and I, in my innocence on a pleasant autumn 
afternoon, wandered too close to the University of Colorado Law School. 
 One might wonder why, as an absentee from those earlier conversations, I 
would become involved now. After all, I have no prior connection with 
Kennedy himself—neither student nor colleague, nor friend (nor enemy). We 
have met on a couple of occasions. I was, of course, influenced as a youthful 
scholar by critical legal studies (CLS), but I was a pretty distant fellow traveler 
(both literally, given that I spent the 1980s in Australia, and intellectually, given 
that CLS never displaced an even more youthful allegiance to Marxism). 
Though I was well aware of Kennedy’s leading role in CLS (who could not be?) 
it was the self-identified CLS historians—Morton Horwitz, Robert Gordon, and 
others—with whom I formed lasting contacts.9 
 In fact, the reason for my involvement in this symposium is quite simple: To 
a historian, Kennedy’s work should be highly intriguing. Much of his early 
scholarly career was devoted to the production of an extended (though mostly 
unpublished) history of Anglo-American legal thought during the later 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal 
Thought.10 Kennedy’s manuscript became a samizdat classic during the heyday 
of CLS. However, outside the CLS circle, his brand of intellectual history has 
not been widely pursued in the general field of legal history, where social 
 
 6.  Kennedy, supra note 4, at 63. 
 7.  Kennedy, supra note 4. 
 8.  Papers from that workshop that focused on Kennedy’s third globalization were subsequently 
published in the Comparative Law Review. See Gruber, supra note 5.  
 9.  Rudely, in the last few years a good bit of my time has been devoted to repaying their 
generosity by developing a critique of their “critical legal history.” See, e.g., Christopher Tomlins, What 
is Left of the Law and Society Paradigm after Critique? Revisiting Gordon’s “Critical Legal Histories,” 
37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 155, 159 (2012); Christopher Tomlins, After Critical Legal History: Scope, 
Scale, Structure, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI., 31, 37 (2012). 
 10.  Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of 
Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850–1940, 3 RES. L. & SOC., 1, 3 (1980). 
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history has long been dominant.11 Because Kennedy does not consider himself a 
historian as such, his commitment to the production of explicitly historical 
scholarship has been episodic rather than continuous.12 As a result, his work sits 
outside the legal-history canon; it has never been intellectually required of legal 
historians that they grapple with it, either in substance or method. This is 
unfortunate but remediable. His work is extremely stimulating and it is good to 
see it continue and expand. Among the generality of legal historians, its time 
may yet come. 
Three Globalizations exemplifies the simultaneously episodic and expansive 
nature of Kennedy’s historical work. It is founded on The Rise and Fall of 
Classical Legal Thought but adds to it in four distinct ways. First, Three 
Globalizations addresses classical legal thought’s successor, which Kennedy 
calls “the social.”13 Second, it traces the origins of both classical legal thought 
and the social to points outside of the United States, thereby describing the 
United States as receptor rather than initiator of these schools of thought. 
Third, as its title suggests, Three Globalizations gives particular attention to the 
international spread of both modes of legal thought. Finally, it sketches the 
outlines of a third globalization—modern legal consciousness—that is more or 
less apparent in the wake of the decomposition of the social after 1968. The 
essay has its own specific genealogy, incarnated first as a lecture on what CLS 
might contribute to peripheral countries; then delivered at a conference on 
globalization held in Bogotá, Colombia, in April 2001; revised and presented 
the following year as a distinguished visitor lecture at Suffolk University Law 
School in Boston; and revised again and published in 2003 under the title Two 
Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–1968 in the Suffolk University 
Law Review.14 Three Globalizations is then a further revision of the Bogota 
lecture and a revised and extended draft of Two Globalizations. This genealogy, 
and the two published essays themselves, help confirm how, since the 1980s, 
much of Kennedy’s attention has been given to the transnational promotion of 
CLS not as the political movement it attempted (and failed) to become in the 
United States, but as “a legal academic school of thought” of use “to the part of 
the intelligentsia of peripheral countries that is interested in left/modernist/post-
 
 11.  Robert Gordon notes that “work on the history of contradictions in legal thought,” which he 
associates with Kennedy, “seems rather to have petered out” compared to the “explosion of . . . work in 
social-legal history” that focuses on “law at the vernacular level, law ‘imbricated’ . . . in structures and 
processes of everyday interaction among social actors.” Robert W. Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories 
Revisited”: A Response, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 200, 209 (2012). For a detailed history of that 
“petering out,” see Justin Desautels-Stein, Structuralist Legal Histories, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
nos. 1–2, 2015 at 37. 
 12.  See Kennedy, supra note 10, at vii–viii, xxvi–xxxi, xl–xlii; see also Duncan Kennedy, 
Introduction to Legal History, DUNCAN KENNEDY, http://duncankennedy.net/legal_history/index.html 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2014) (explaining “[i]t seems only fair to warn the reader in advance that I have no 
formal academic training in the field, and that my reasons for writing legal history have little to do with 
those that characterize the Unitedstatesean post-60’s academic mainstream in this area”). 
 13.  Kennedy, supra note 4, at 22, 37–62. 
 14.  These details are all recounted in Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal 
Thought: 1850–1968, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631, 631 (2003). 
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modernist critiques of the current world system.”15 
I 
The 2011 University of Colorado workshop gave particular attention to the 
third globalization, which remains the least developed of Kennedy’s phases of 
legal thought. At least some of those participating in the workshop took their 
task to be to fill in some of the third globalization’s substantive blanks. I have 
more to say about this in part II of this article, but my objective is to assess the 
entire effort, so I begin at the beginning, which returns us to the question of 
method. 
Kennedy’s object of attention is not law per se but legal consciousness—the 
“structure of categories, concepts, conventionally understood procedures, and 
conventionally given typical legal arguments” within which thinking about law 
occurs, supplemented by structures of subjective experience.16 The “structure of 
categories . . . “ constitutes a mode of thought, or langue, that is sufficiently 
stable to be capable of production, transmission, and reproduction, but not so 
constraining as to predicate specific outcomes.17 Outcomes—the “specific, 
positively enacted rules” that express the mode of thought in action in different 
fields of law—are paroles, practices capable of indefinite variation within the 
boundaries of the mode of thought, according to subjective circumstance, 
locality, and so forth.18 As all this indicates, Kennedy’s method is structuralist, 
derived from semiotics.19 
Visually, one can imagine Three Globalizations as a succession of cycles 
within circles. Each langue undergoes a cycle of growth, maturity, and decay 
within an expanding, then contracting, circle of transmission. As each cycle 
decays or contracts, it leaves behind continuing traces of itself, like wreckage on 
a beach after the tide ebbs, available to be combed and recycled. Each cycle’s 
decay–contraction overlaps with its successor’s growth–expansion, and indeed 
the two are related in that the successor is a reaction to, and critique of, the 
predecessor. Critique does not occur, however, as a response to the 
predecessor’s ideological or philosophical substance, for the very good reason 
that in Kennedy’s account—within very broad limits20—a langue has no 
 
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Duncan Kennedy, Introduction to Legal History, DUNCAN KENNEDY, 
http://duncankennedy.net/legal_history/index.html#LC (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
 17.  Kennedy, supra note 4, at 23. 
 18.  Id. There is some tension in Kennedy’s account between the emphasis upon parole variation 
and the contention (in the U.S. case) that “development in different fields of law over the last century 
followed a single pattern.” Id. at 25. 
 19.  See Justin Desautels-Stein, Experimental Pragmatism in the Third Globalization, 9 CONTEMP. 
PRAGMATISM 175, 183 (2012). 
 20.  Kennedy writes: 
Classical [l]egal [t]hought was liberal in either a conservative or progressive way, according to 
how it balanced public and private in market and household. The social could be socialist or 
social democratic or Catholic or [s]ocial Christian or fascist (but not communist or classical 
liberal). Modern legal consciousness is the common property of right wing and left wing rights 
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ideological or philosophical substance.21 (This of course is not true of its 
multifarious paroles, which can and do express a profusion of ideologies and 
philosophies.) Rather, each langue is “a way of thinking without an essence.”22 
What distinguishes each from the next is simply that it is a distinct way of 
thinking about law. Thus, the first cycle–globalization, classical legal thought 
(1850–1914), is a way of thinking about law “as a system of spheres of autonomy 
for private and public actors, with the boundaries of spheres defined by legal 
reasoning understood as a scientific practice.”23 The second cycle–globalization, 
that of the social (1900–1968), is a way of thinking about law “as a purposive 
activity, as a regulatory mechanism that could and should facilitate the 
evolution of social life in accordance with ever greater perceived social 
interdependence at every level, from the family to the world of nations.”24 The 
third, problematic cycle (1945–2000) has no discernible single “way of 
thinking.” It is simply the sum of the distinct expressions of legal consciousness 
that prevail in the present. As this implies, its way of thinking is plural and 
contradictory, simultaneously postclassical and postsocial, a reaction to both 
that also reproduces elements of both anew. The third is “the unsynthesized 
coexistence of transformed elements of CLT with transformed elements of the 
social.”25 If this sounds untidy, that is because it is.26 
Kennedy offers no “overarching theory of what caused these modes of 
thought to emerge when they did, of what determined their internal structural 
properties, of the particulars of their geographic reception, or of their effects or 
functions in social life.”27 He does, however, identify their provenance. Classical 
legal thought originates in Germany and spreads throughout the world via 
“influence within the system of autonomous Western nation states and 
imperialism broadly conceived.”28 It is widely influential in the Anglosphere.29 
At its point of focus lies the reconciliation of individual wills. The social also 
 
theorists, and right-wing and left-wing policy analysts. 
Kennedy, supra note 4, at 22. 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id. at 20–22. 
 24.  Id. at 22. 
 25.  Id. at 63. Although Kennedy’s dates (1945–2000) imply that the third cycle is over, it seems to 
me one cannot really detect an “end” yet to modern legal consciousness as he defines it, and therefore 
it remains. 
 26.  For a sense of this modern–postmodern “untidiness” on an epic scale and a struggle to define 
it, see BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION (1995). 
 27.  Kennedy, supra note 4, at 23–24.  
 28.  Id. at 28. 
 29.  Anglosphere is a recently formulated neologism referring to the English-speaking “network” 
formed by English settler colonialism—the United Kingdom, Ireland, the United States, English-
speaking Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—supplemented by English-influenced former colonies 
of possession—the English-speaking Caribbean, English-speaking Oceania and the English-speaking 
populations of Africa and India. The term was coined by Neal Stephenson in THE DIAMOND AGE: OR, 
A YOUNG LADY’S ILLUSTRATED PRIMER (1995). 
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begins in Germany, but its most complete early expression is French. Whereas 
classical legal thought is the mode of the academic jurist (law professor), the 
social is the mode of the legislator whose object of attention is society as an 
interdependent organism.30 As the social globalizes, it feeds on, and is fed on by, 
nationalism, and it undergoes endless transfigurations from European fascism 
to Latin American authoritarianism and autarky, to Christian and social 
democracy, to anti-imperial independence movements. Its apotheosis lies in its 
post–World War II union with Keynesian macroeconomics. The third 
globalization has its origins in the postwar United States, and it lionizes the 
judiciary but has no particular point of focus. Everything that Kennedy says 
about it actually suggests absence rather than presence, a mode of thought that 
is not in fact modal at all—all paroles, no langue.31 
Kennedy’s account of the first two globalizations is lengthy and not without 
considerable detail.32 It is, however, necessarily schematic. In his own words his 
essay “covers a very large amount of material both in time and space” by 
employing “sweeping assertions . . . supported by a minimal footnote 
apparatus . . . rather than sustained research.”33 This is not simply a 
consequence of a decision to synthesize but a matter of method. Kennedy 
proceeds from the universal—the successive cyclic langues of legal 
consciousness—to the particular practices—the paroles—that instantiate them. 
The former are sharply delineated. The latter, infinite in number, can only be 
sketched, hinted, skimmed, and generalized. The goal is structural, both in the 
sense of creating a taxonomy that sorts empirical data, and in the sense of 
offering a method for historical legal study that itself embodies a way of 
thinking—a langue that may be instantiated in the paroles of others who have 
tested and will participate in testing the explanatory capacity of its structure of 
categories.34 
The way of thinking that the essay embodies, Kennedy explains, is 
 
 30.  On the expression of this perspective in the U.S. case, see Christopher Tomlins, Framing the 
Field of Law’s Disciplinary Encounters: A Historical Narrative, 34 LAW & SOC. REV., 911, 925–26 
(2000). 
 31.  Catharine Wells, Thoughts on Duncan Kennedy’s Third Globalization, 3 COMP. L. REV., 1–2, 
7, 9 (2012). This seems to me also to be the message of Giovanni Marini’s Taking Comparative Law 
Lightly. On Some Uses of Comparative Law in the Third Globalization, 3 COMP. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 32.  Inevitably one can quibble here and there. Were there no globalizations before 1850? The 
Anglosphere had quite a lot of legal consciousness in common before 1850. Whether English 
imperialism was a globalization, of course, depends on one’s definition of “globe,” but the sun never set 
on it, and Kennedy’s own globe has some empty spaces too: the Russian Empire–USSR, for example, is 
an absentee; Africa is mainly an add-on in the analysis compared with close attention to Latin America. 
Timing, too, could be made more ragged than the neat divisions of 1850–1914, 1900–1968, and 1945–
2000. Jhering’s fight against the German historical school’s Begriffsjurisprudenz (jurisprudence of 
concepts) begins barely a decade after the inception date of Kennedy’s first globalization. See 
Christopher Tomlins, History in the American Juridical Field: Narrative, Justification, Explanation, 16 
YALE J. L. & HUM. 323, 361–62 (2004). As I said, one can quibble. 
 33.  Kennedy, supra note 4, at 20. 
 34.  That it is such is confirmed by many of the sources that are cited—“reports about the work 
done by [Duncan’s] graduate students on Asian, African and South American Law.” See John Henry 
Schlegel, Together Again, 3 COMP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012). 
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(unsurprisingly) CLS: “[c]ritical legal studies [is] the approach of this article.”35 
What does this entail? Two related propositions. First, that legal institutions 
and ideas are not simply “frameworks or contexts” for other developments but 
are constitutive of them.36 They are constitutive in particular when it comes to 
that other looming omnipresence of assumptive causality, economic activity. 
Kennedy establishes this very firmly, right from the outset: “economic activity 
can[no]t be understood as something autonomous in relation to a set of passive 
institutional and legal conceptual constraints, as the term’s framework and 
context suggests. Legal institutions have a dynamic, or dialectical, or 
constitutive relationship to economic activity.”37 Even more firmly, they are 
constitutive not as a matter of relational theorizing, as is often the penchant of 
law-and-society scholarship,38 but in the nitty-gritty of day-to-day professional 
struggle. “[S]trong economic actors influence law making just as much as they 
are constrained by it,” but it is lawyers who throw the switch: “lawyers for 
economic actors, lawyers working as legislators, judges and legal academics . . .  
have a professionally legitimated role to play, a role that parallels and overlaps 
that of the economic power-holders.”39 Here, I think, Kennedy is directly 
addressing the “intelligentsia of peripheral countries” whom he desires to 
convince of the utility of CLS as “a legal academic school of thought” in their 
own formative struggles.40 He is also addressing that audience in the final 
paragraph of the essay, which returns to the same theme of contemporary 
possibility: 
The three globalizations are incidents in the story of military force, economic power, 
and ideological hegemony within the capitalist period of world history. But I 
understand this period not as playing out the logic of capital, but rather as the period 
of universal rationalization, paradoxically intertwined with the death of reason. The 
death of reason permits (but does not require or in itself bring about) the taking back 
of alienated powers that can be used for local or national or transnational change 
toward equality, community, and wild risky play.41 
From this first proposition follows the second, that life—and possibility—is 
unimaginable without (constitutive) law.42 In other words Kennedy refuses 
 
 35.  Kennedy, supra note 4, at 71. 
 36.  Id. at 19. 
 37.  Id. at 19. I am, of course, not the only person to have underlined this passage, which appears in 
the third paragraph of Three Globalizations. See John Henry Schlegel, Three Globalizations: An Essay 
in Inquiry, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 1–2, 2015 at 19. 
 38.  On which, see Christopher Tomlins, How Autonomous is Law?, 3 ANN. REV.  L. & SOC. SCI. 
45, 48–49 (2007), and, in a lighter vein, Christopher Tomlins, Bucking the Party Line, 39 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 226 (2014).  
 39.  Kennedy, supra note 4, at 20. 
 40.  Kennedy, supra note 14, at 631. The sentiment is reminiscent of E.P. Thompson’s gauzy and 
condescending “Causes which were lost in England might, in Asia or Africa, yet be won.” E.P. 
THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 13 (1966). But Kennedy, unlike the 
Thompson of Whigs and Hunters, is no rule-of-law romantic. See E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND 
HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 258–69 (1975); see also Tomlins, supra note 38, at 49–52. 
 41.  Kennedy, supra note 4, at 72–73. 
 42.  As Schlegel puts it, “[t]he privileging of law—and, indirectly, lawyers and legal academics—in 
the discussion that is going to follow is all but complete.” Schlegel, supra note 37, at 22. 
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Foucault’s invitation “to suppose that [law] does not exist,” to ask “what can 
history make of these different events and practices which are apparently 
organized around something that is supposed to be [law]?”  Instead he engages 
in the “historicist reduction.” He “starts from the universal and . . . puts it 
through the grinder of history.”43 The result: three cycles, on each of which 
centers a circle. Why is this problematic? 
In fact, as a matter of historical narrative, I think it is not problematic—not 
at least for the first and second globalizations. In each of these cases Kennedy 
offers a persuasive account of a recognizable mode of legal thought, evidence of 
its existence as such, and a narrative of its transnational generalization from an 
identifiable point of West European origin, all in reasonable accord with, for 
what it is worth, my own sense of what is happening in regions I know 
something about (the Anglosphere) and such other specialist literature with 
which I am familiar.44 His “heterodox” observations on the U.S. case in relation 
to the first and second globalizations thus seem quite defensible. U.S. scholars 
who might bridle at Kennedy’s description of the United States until the 1930s 
as “a context of legal reception,” progenitor of an  “original synthesis” (I take 
this to mean U.S. antebellum legal thought) with no exterior influence of its 
own, will find much to confirm Kennedy’s contentions in David Rabban’s 
 
 43.  FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 3. 
 44.  One of Kennedy’s “modest” ambitions for Three Globalizations is that other researchers will 
confirm its hypotheses “by finding things that uncannily correspond to what one would have predicted 
given the narrative.” In that spirit I draw to his attention (but perhaps he has already encountered it) 
Cheng-Yi Huang’s wonderful article, Enacting the “Incomprehensible China”: Modern European 
Jurisprudence and the Japanese Reconstruction of Qing Political Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 955, 
955–56 (2008). (I happened to be Law and Social Inquiry’s editor at the time.) The abstract reads as 
follows:  
The great ambition of Japanese colonialism, from the time of its debut at the end of the 
nineteenth century, was the reformulation of Chinese law and politics. One of the most 
extraordinary examples of this ambition is The Administrative Law of the Qing Empire 
[Shinkoku Gyōseihō], a monumental enterprise undertaken by the Japanese colonial 
government in Taiwan intended not only to facilitate Japanese colonial administration of 
Taiwan but also to reorder the entire politico-juridical order of China along the lines of 
modern rational law. This article examines the legal analysis embraced in The Administrative 
Law of the Qing Empire and recounts its attempt to reconstruct the Qing’s “political law” 
(seihō) by a strange, ambiguous, and hybrid resort to “authenticity.” The strangeness of this 
Japanese colonial production comes from Japan’s dual position as both colonizer of Taiwan 
and simultaneously itself colonized by “modern European jurisprudence” (kinsei hōri). In 
uncovering the effects of modern European jurisprudence on the Japanese enterprise, we will 
discover Japan’s pursuit of its own cultural subjectivity embedded in The Administrative Law 
of the Qing Empire, epitomizing the campaign of national identities observable in the process 
of East Asian legal modernization. 
Id. at 955. The Administrative Law of the Qing Empire purported to be a translation of imperial 
Chinese law, but, Huang shows, it was not. “It is organized in the European genre of Pandekten 
(Pandects) rather than in traditional Chinese statutory format . . . [It] incorporates Western legal 
knowledge,” an infusion that was not the work of European jurists “but of Japanese scholars who had 
only started to learn Western law a short time before the appearance of the survey.” Finally, it was 
prepared not only for the use of Japanese colonial officers “but also for the Chinese themselves; the 
objects of this colonial investigation.”  
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recent Law’s History.45 Kennedy’s insistence that legal realism was an assault on 
the social rather than a manifestation of it recalls contemporary literature that 
emphasized the personal split between Pound and the realists46 and sidelines 
work that has teased out realism’s links with social science.47 But the point is 
made fleetingly.48 Other heterodoxies are matters of long-time local dispute 
between Griswold Hall, Room 311 and the former occupant of 310 (now 
Langdell Library 308).49 
Where the matter seems more problematic is in the carryover of cycle-
within-circle to the third globalization. Here the problem is that there is no 
obvious universal from which to start, no emergent langue to transnationalize, 
only paroles.50 This is where Foucault’s invitation (with which we began) 
suggests that Kennedy is proceeding in his third cycle in the same manner as in  
the first and second, the absence of any “discernible large integrating concept” 
notwithstanding.51 His method has become that of the fiction: proceed as if.  
What about instead simply recognizing the absence as absence? “[W]hat can 
history make of these different events and practices which are apparently 
organized around something”52 that is not there? 
 
 45.  DAVID RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC 
TURN TO HISTORY (2013). But see KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY 
IN AMERICA, 1790–1900: LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM (2011), which offers a quite distinct 
intellectual history of American legal consciousness in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
 46.  See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960 44–46 (1986) and works cited 
therein.  
 47.  See generally JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL 
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995). 
 48.  Nevertheless it is significant. Though on one reading, to divorce American legal realism from 
the social and leave it hanging in one brief sentence is to reduce it to a provincial “Unitedstatesean” 
peculiarity, I do not think this is the objective at all. Legal realism is, rather, an “antisocial” wormhole 
that connects with and empowers CLS by fortifying it with Weberian means, thereby setting it apart 
from other “sects” of modern legal consciousness, potentially a langue of its very own in the making 
(Kennedy has made this genealogical argument in greater detail elsewhere). See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, 
The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy 
of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 1031, 1066 (2004); see also 
infra text accompanying notes 88–103. 
 49.  Kennedy, supra note 4, at 25 n.6; see also Morton Horwitz, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10405/Horwitz (last visited Nov. 1, 2014); Duncan 
Kennedy, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10469/Kennedy (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2014).  
 50.  Jorge Esquirol finds the representation of parole multiplicity, particularly in the third 
globalization, attractive. See Jorge L. Esquirol, The ‘Three Globalizations’ in Latin America, 3 COMP. L. 
REV. 1, 3, 7–11 (2012). Esquirol proposes that the coherent langues of the first two globalizations are in 
fact hybrid in the peripheral “contexts of reception.” See SANTOS, supra note 26. From the periphery, 
the absence of a langue emanating from a center is potentially empowering of the periphery. It may 
encourage the periphery to generate a langue that can globalize the erstwhile, self-proclaimed, center. 
See DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND 
HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE (2000). However, my conclusion about the dynamics implicit in Kennedy’s 
essay is different. 
 51.  Kennedy, supra note 4, at 63.  
 52.  FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 3. 
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II 
Three Globalizations purports to be organizational and descriptive—“a set 
of boxes for the organization of facts” and the generation of hypotheses.53 
Kennedy’s description of his essay is reminiscent of Milton Friedman’s 
description of economic theory as “a filing system.”54 And of course the 
similarity is methodological in that economic theory, in Friedman’s terms, 
fulfills all the conditions of Kennedy’s langue. 
Viewed as a language, theory has no substantive content; it is a set of tautologies. Its 
function is to serve as a filing system for organizing empirical material and facilitating 
our understanding of it; and the criteria by which it is to be judged are those 
appropriate to a filing system. Are the categories clearly and precisely defined? Are 
they exhaustive? Do we know where to file each individual item, or is there 
considerable ambiguity?55 
And so on. Friedman here is actually invoking the langue-like character of 
one sort of economic theory—positive economics—to distinguish it, sharply, 
from another sort—“normative or regulative” economics.56 He is doing so, with 
some wit, in the name of John Neville Keynes (the father of John Maynard 
Keynes).57 He is doing so in 1953—early in the upswing of Kennedy’s third 
cycle. And he is doing so with explicit acknowledgment of the capacity of the 
langue of positive economics to produce “indefinite” parole-like variation.58 
What is being encountered here, I believe, is the presence absent from the 
third globalization. It is a presence that The Birth of Biopolitics insists we 
recognize.59 And, interestingly enough, it is a presence (like the first two 
globalizations) that has its point of origin in Germany. 
The presence is neoliberalism. It emerges as a critique of the social, in the 
process of which (Friedman’s invocation of the elder Keynes is an instance of 
this60) it deploys aspects of what the social criticized, particularly its formalist 
conception of science—“a body of systematized knowledge concerning what 
is”—against what the social proffered in its place—“a body of systematized 
 
 53.  Kennedy, supra note 4, at 24. 
 54.  Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN 
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3–43 (1966). 
 55.  Id. at 7. 
 56.  Id. at 3. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  For example:  
Closely related differences in positive analysis underlie divergent views about the appropriate 
role and place of trade-unions and the desirability of direct price and wage controls and of 
tariffs. Different predictions about the importance of so-called ‘economies of scale’ account 
very largely for divergent views about the desirability or necessity of detailed government 
regulation of industry and even of socialism rather than private enterprise. And this list could 
be extended indefinitely. 
Id. at 6. 
 59.  See also Kerry Rittich, Making Natural Markets: Flexibility as Labour Market Truth, 3 COMP. 
L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 60.  See Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in FRIEDMAN, supra note 54. 
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knowledge discussing criteria of what ought to be.”61 But, crucially, it does not 
resile from the social’s regulatory capacities; rather, it redeploys them.62 Above 
all, however, its langue is not a mode of legal thought. Its “events and practices” 
are organized around a mode of economic thought—neoclassical economics.63 
Kennedy does not ignore neoliberalism, but his attention to it is fleeting in 
large part because neoliberalism is, in his terms, a right-wing ideology rather 
than a consciousness or mode of thought from which multiple political projects 
can issue.64 But to treat neoliberalism as such is to discount its capacity to be “a 
filing system” that can generate indefinite variation. And, in fact, to make “the 
neoliberal” the absent presence of the third globalization is highly compatible 
with Kennedy’s characterization of modern legal consciousness, the mode of 
(contemporary) legal thought that is the subject of the third globalization, as a 
schizophrenic oscillation between neoformalism, balancing tests, and rights. 
What this reinforces, however, is that the plural and contradictory legal paroles 
of the third globalization—all variations and reformulations of what went 
before—are not simply manifestations of the absence of a coherent legal langue; 
they are manifestations of chaotic legal response to the domination of the 
current neoliberal cycle by an economic and not a legal mode of thought.65 
The Birth of Biopolitics is a genealogy of liberalism, considered to be an art 
of government, organized around four propositions. First, liberalism is not a 
theory or an ideology but a practice, “a way of doing things.”66 Second, 
liberalism “regulat[es] itself by continuous reflection.”67 As such, it is a practice 
that changes. Third, as “a principle and method of the rationalization of the 
 
 61.  John Neville Keynes, The Scope and Method of Political Economy, in FRIEDMAN, supra note 
54, at 34–35. 
 62.  FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 129–289, 317. The Birth of Biopolitics was to have been a 
genealogy of governmental practices since the nineteenth century rationalizing “the problems posed . . . 
by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birthrate, 
life expectancy, race” and so forth. In fact, Foucault spends the entire course of lectures on an 
introductory analysis of liberalism and neoliberalism: “It seemed to me that these problems were 
inseparable from the framework of political rationality within which they appeared and took on their 
intensity. This means ‘liberalism’ since it was in relation to liberalism that they assumed the form of a 
challenge.” Id. at 317. Nevertheless, the questions toward which The Birth of Biopolitics points are, 
“How can the phenomena of ‘population,’ with its specific effects and problems, be taken into account 
in a system concerned about respect for legal subjects and individual free enterprise?  In the name of 
what and according to what rules can it be managed?” Id. (emphasis added).  
 63.  Kennedy seems actually to acknowledge this, indirectly and in passing: “My hope is that the 
‘three globalizations’ narrative will support the conviction that the progressive elites of the periphery 
can and should devise national progressive strategies, rather than accept the prescription of the center, 
that they simply ‘open’ their economies and ‘reform’ their legal systems.” Kennedy, supra note 4, at 24. 
 64.  Id. at 28. Foucault, in contrast, does not treat neoliberalism as ideology, but rather as one more 
expression of a liberal art of government that consistently asks how much government is too much.  
 65.  Response can be supportive or condemnatory, approving or alienated; it can be left or right or 
reactionary. The main point is that the multiple paroles of legal response are not specific instantiations 
of the mode of thought being globalized but rather are echoes or reformulations of the surpassed legal 
langues of the first and second globalizations, which, in default of anything new, are supplying the 
means of response to the centrality of a nonlegal langue. 
 66.  FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 318. 
 67.  Id. 
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exercise of government,” liberalism begins from the premise “that [the activity 
of] government . . . cannot be its own end.”68 Finally, and liberalism’s 
fundamental question: “What is the utility value of government and all actions 
of government in a society where exchange value determines the true value of 
things?”69 
The first and second globalizations can both be understood as the 
generalization of successive and distinct modes of legal thought, centered on 
precisely these four propositions, in which “the economic” is subordinate to or 
constituted by “the legal.”70 The third globalization cannot be understood that 
way because neoliberalism reverses the relationship: in both theory and fact it 
addresses these principles and questions in the langue of economic thought. 
Take as exemplary Foucault’s account of neoliberalism’s origins in Germany. 
He points to the Freiburg School of “ordoliberal” economists (so called because 
they were grouped around the journal Ordo founded in 1936), whose 
importance lies in their centrality to post–World War II German reconstruction 
and its absolute commitment to “‘the direction of the economic process by the 
price mechanism,’” that is, by the operation of a free-market economy rather 
than by state planning.71 As an art of government, ordoliberalism does not 
propose to render the state redundant in favor of a “naïve naturalism” of 
exchange.72 Market freedom is a creature of competition, not exchange, and 
(unlike classical conceptions of exchange73) there is nothing natural 
(spontaneously self-sustaining) about competition.74 Competition requires the 
 
 68.  Id. As such, liberalism is profoundly distinct from cameralism and its administrative expression 
polizeiwissenschaft, in reaction to which, in Germany, it arose. As the nineteenth-century German jurist 
and codifier (and liberal opponent of Bismark) Eduard Lasker put it, “rule of law and rule of police are 
two different ways to which history points, two methods of development between which peoples must 
choose and have chosen.” See WILLIAM REDDY, MONEY AND LIBERTY IN MODERN EUROPE: A 
CRITIQUE OF HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 16 (1987). 
 69.  FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 46.  
 70.  “The economic” is subordinate in the sense that the first and second globalizations both 
formulate liberalisms in which the market is defined by the state as a space of definitively ‘economic’ 
activity circumscribed by the state that supervises it to the extent the state deems appropriate (which 
could mean anything from “not at all” to “completely,” depending on the state’s parole). 
 71.  FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 47. Note that this is not simply a response to National Socialism 
(which, Foucault points out, was in any case the rule of a party not of a state) but to the far longer 
history of étatism in Germany—Weimar, World War I’s planned economy, Bismarck, polizei, 
cameralism, and so forth. So what is proposed here is, for Germany, a wholly new concept of economic 
activity. 
 72.  FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 120. On the historical relationship between claims of “natural 
order” in the economy and liberal and neoliberal legal thought, see BERNARD HARCOURT, THE 
ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2011). 
 73.  For example, Adam Smith’s:  
This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect 
of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives 
occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain 
propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to 
truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another. 
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 24 (1981). 
 74.  FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 120–21. 
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state and its regulatory capacity as an essential guarantor of market freedom 
and as judicial arbitrator of the endless frictions of competition. It requires a 
state that governs for the market and that molds society to the market 
economy’s competitive rationality. The objective is “an economic-juridical 
ensemble,” a “regulated set of activities,” operative in a rule-of-law state that 
“tell[s] people what they must and must not do” without devoting itself to a 
particular outcome.75 But, crucially, it is from their roles as both guarantor of 
market freedom and formal arbiter of competition that the reconstructed state 
and its institutions derive their legitimacy, such that 
in contemporary Germany, the economy, economic development and economic 
growth, produces sovereignty; it produces political sovereignty through the institution 
and institutional game that, precisely, make this economy work. The economy 
produces legitimacy for the state that is its guarantor . . . [T]he element that comes 
first in this kind of siphon is the economic institution.76 
And more: 
the economy does not only bring a juridical structure or legal legitimization to a 
German state that history had just debarred. This economic institution, the economic 
freedom that from the start it is the role of this institution to guarantee and maintain, 
produces something even more real, concrete, and immediate than a legal 
legitimization; it produces a permanent consensus of all those who may appear as 
agents within these economic processes, as investors, workers, employers, and trade 
unions. All these economic partners produce a consensus, which is a political 
consensus, inasmuch as they accept this economic game of freedom.77 
The neoliberal langue of economic freedom and guarantor rule-of-law state 
described by Foucault transmits and generalizes precisely as classical legal 
thought and the social have been transmitted and generalized.78 This cycle also 
has a circle centered upon it. Once again, the Anglosphere (notably Britain and 
the United States) is the receptor. The transmitters are people (Ludwig von 
Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Aaron Director, Ronald Coase), their books and 
journals, and institutions (the London School of Economics, the University of 
Chicago, the Olin Foundation).79 As the cycle matures, its ambit widens: in 
“soft” Europe it becomes known as the social market economy.80 In the 
“anarcho-capitalist” United States, human-capital theory and the enterprise 
society mold a homo œconomicus who becomes “the correlate of a 
governmentality which will act on [his] environment and systematically modify 
its variables.”81 Particularly in its U.S. form, the cycle seeks the absolute 
 
 75.  Id. at 163, 172. 
 76.  Id. at 84. 
 77.  Id.  
 78.  See KEYNES, supra note 61; see also Esquirol, supra note 50, at 3. 
 79.  For a useful though incomplete intellectual history of the American case, see Edmund W. 
Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932–1970, 26 J. L. & 
ECON., 163, 189–92 (1983); see also HARCOURT, supra note 72, at 121–50. 
 80.  The idea of the social market economy (Soziale Marktwirtshcaft) originated in Germany under 
the first postwar Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, and his Christian Democratic Union administration. It 
spread to Austria and France and eventually became a central principle of the European Union.  
 81.  FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 271. 
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“generalization of the economic form of the market . . . throughout the social 
body” and indeed throughout the state itself, “assess[ing] government action in 
strictly economic and market terms.”82 
I could go on. But The Birth of Biopolitics is there to be read by anyone who 
so desires, and by now my main point is surely evident: Although at 
neoliberalism’s point of inception its ordoliberal exponents embraced it as “an 
economic-juridical ensemble” (Walter Eucken called it “the system”83), its 
essential premises are economic rather than juridical. In other words, the third 
globalization is organized around a langue of economic thought to which legal 
thought is essentially supplementary. This is why, in the available analyses of 
the legal consciousness of the third globalization, one encounters (1) the 
spectacle of criminal law and criminal-justice institutions reorganized around 
the market and market behavior;84 (2) reformist legal activity premised on the 
inevitability of the market economy’s continuing centrality,85 concentrating on 
opportunities for a more democratic capitalism that might exist in variations of 
governmental and enterprise scale;86 and (3) a significant instance of 
experimentalism in contemporary legal thought that, on close analysis, is not 
distinguishable in its premises from the forms of legal thought that more 
directly implement neoliberal economics.87 Each is a legal parole that, in the 
process of constitutively targeting society for the market, instantiates the langue 
of neoliberal economics. All this suggests that, in the ways of thinking that 
characterize modern legal consciousness, the range of what is constitutively 
possible is significantly narrower than the breadth of imagination characteristic, 
according to Kennedy, of classical legal thought and the social. 
III 
One question remains: What is the relationship of Kennedy’s own mode of 
thought—critical legal studies—to “modern legal consciousness”? 
If he is right, and the third globalization does have a legal-intellectual langue 
of its own, then, as an instantiation of modern legal consciousness, CLS must 
necessarily exist somewhere along its (schizophrenic and chaotic) continuum 
between neoformalism derived from the first globalization and balancing 
derived from the second, presumably closer to the latter than the former. There 
is some evidence that this could be a plausible location for at least some forms 
 
 82.  Id. at 243, 247.  For the effects (and the paroles of “outsider jurisprudence” or “jurisprudence 
of alienation” that these provoke) see Wells, supra note 31, at 8–9. 
 83.  FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 163. 
 84.  HARCOURT, supra note 72, at 191–239; FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 239–65; Gruber, supra 
note 5, at 10–17, 18–25 (noting the extraordinary salience of criminal law–criminal justice to neoliberal 
globalization, but attributing this to the victim’s rights movement, mass communications, and 
“spectacle-based legalism.”)  
 85.  Amy J. Cohen, ADR and some Thoughts on the Social in Duncan Kennedy’s Third 
Globalization of Legal Thought, 3 COMP. L. REV. 1 (2012).   
 86.  Amy J. Cohen, The Law and Political Economy of Food: Some Reflections on the Local and 
the Small, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 1–2, 2015, at 101. 
 87.  Desautels-Stein, supra note 19. 
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of CLS. For example, Mark Kelman notes that, seen from the perspective of 
legal academic thought, CLS 
might well seem to be the latest revival of an anti-Formalist, Legal Realist movement 
at law schools that have historically vacillated between ‘conceptualists’ believing in 
both the autonomy and scientific purity of judicial legal discourse and policy-oriented 
scholars who felt that legal discourse was just economics, psychology, or politics 
applied to disputes processed by courts, agencies that more or less wield only certain 
forms of state power.88 
But Kelman actually wrote his book to distinguish CLS from 
“deconstructive [r]ealist critique.”89 Meanwhile, although Kennedy does 
associate CLS with realism, the association is not with realism’s deconstructivist 
tendencies but with its transmission into the United States of “Weber’s basic 
critiques of the social—that it illegitimately attempted to generate a legislative 
ought from the is of social change, and that it often (not always) tried to 
bootstrap validity in the juristic sense from the facts of regularity of behavior 
and normative consensus.”90 
Indeed, what is really interesting about the reception of Weber into U.S. 
legal thought in Kennedy’s account is that it is “not prophetic” of anything. 
Instead it is “quickly succeeded” by something distinctly non-Weberian, the 
contemporary mode of legal thought (modern legal consciousness) in the form 
of policy analysis, into which is blended “formalized substantive rationality,” 
and balancing, and human rights judicial review.91 The Weberian-realist thread 
is left hanging until CLS picks it up again. In other words, Kennedy’s account of 
CLS is inconsistent with his account of the relationship between langue and 
parole in legal thought. CLS is not a parole form of the langue of contemporary 
legal thought, but something distinct—a resumption of the reception of Weber 
into U.S. legal thought.92 
Another way to answer the question is to assume I am right. There is no 
langue of contemporary legal thought. “Modern legal consciousness” is simply 
the sum total of parole responses to a neoliberal langue that originates outside 
legal thought. If so, CLS can function as one of those responses. It is hardly an 
enthusiastic response (like law and economics), or a response of critical 
implementation (like the various pragmatisms discussed by Desautels-Stein93) 
so presumably it is located somewhere amidst the oppositional jurisprudences 
 
 88.  MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 11 (1987). 
 89.  Id. at 12–13. 
 90.  Kennedy, supra note 48, at 1070. One should note that both Kelman and Kennedy are 
preoccupied with critical legal studies in the forms it took in the United States. This is understandable, 
given that CLS is of U.S. origins, but also parochial, in that it has flourished continuously for longer and 
in a greater diversity of forms elsewhere in the Anglosphere. See, e.g., Costas Douzinas, A Short 
History of the British Critical Legal Conference, or The Responsibility of the Critic, 24 LAW & 
CRITIQUE 2, 8 (2014).  
 91.  Kennedy, supra note 48, at 1070–75. 
 92.  Id. at 1032, 1076. 
 93.  See Justin Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in Contemporary 
Legal Analysis, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 565 (2007)  
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of alienation—critical race theory, feminist theory, queer theory, among 
others—that Catharine Wells identifies.94 But “oppositional jurisprudence of 
alienation” does not accord with my sense of what CLS meant or means. 
Whether a historically failed political movement or a more current “legal 
academic school of thought,” CLS seems to me to have aimed persistently (and 
in a sense cheerfully) at a far different relationship to its political-intellectual 
environment than oppositional alienation. Kennedy will not mind, I hope, if I 
cite Unger: “[W]e have refused to mistake the ramshackle settlements of this 
postwar age for the dispensations of moral providence or historical fate . . . .  
We build with what we have, and willingly pay the price for the inconformity of 
vision to circumstance.”95 
Kennedy has identified CLS as one of modern legal theory’s sects.96 As such 
it cannot stand outside modern legal consciousness. Nevertheless, Kennedy’s 
CLS has distinctly metatheoretical ambitions, as the whole project of Three 
Globalizations attests.97 To that extent it exists within modern legal 
consciousness like the originators of the social did within classical legal 
thought—the potential agent of decomposition that aspires to transcend the 
conditions of its existence.98 As such, Kennedy’s organizational concentration 
on the periphery might be seen as an attempt to create a basis there for a fourth 
globalization (which, by his dating system, is certainly due)—an attempt to 
enlist that “part of the intelligentsia of peripheral countries that is interested in 
left/modernist/post-modernist critiques of the current world system” in a further 
“‘plan’ or project of those with access to the legal, administrative, and judicial 
processes in [ex-]colonies and states, a project for influencing economic 
activity.”99 If the first globalization was the triumph of classical liberalism over 
premodern economic and social policy, the second the triumph of laissez-faire’s 
critics, and the third the triumph of neoliberal economics over the social, then 
the fourth can be a further transformation, led once more by lawyers, “of 
how . . . society understands economic development.”100 Kennedy’s CLS hence 
becomes the means to “tak[e] back . . . alienated powers that can be used for 
local or national or transnational change toward equality, community and wild 
risky play.”101 
Denizens of the global center know that each of the center’s globalizations 
has wrought its own particular brand of havoc (military force, economic power, 
ideological hegemony) on the periphery. Each has proven by its example that 
 
 94.  Wells, supra note 31, at 9. 
 95.  ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 118–19 
(1986). 
 96.  See Kennedy, supra note 48, at 1032. 
 97.  Wells, supra note 31, at 2–4. 
 98.  Historically, then, its position is analogous to Kennedy’s insistent description of legal realism 
as in but not of the langue that informed its present. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 99.  Kennedy, supra note 4, at 20; Kennedy, supra note 14, at 631. 
 100.  Kennedy, supra note 4, at 20. 
 101.  Id. at 73. 
TOMLINS_EIC (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2015  12:47 PM 
Nos. 1 & 2 2015] THE PRESENCE AND ABSENCE OF LEGAL MIND 17 
law is politics by other means. On the other hand, peripheral revolutions stoked 
by the center’s intellectuals have their own checkered history. Kennedy asserts 
that politics is law by other means, and he cites Weber to support the 
contention.102 As an admirer of Weber, he will be aware of Weber’s advice that 
“an ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility are not absolute 
contrasts but rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine 
man—a man who can have the ‘calling for politics.’”103 At the same time as one 
applauds the ultimate ends, one hopes that this man knows what he is doing. 
 
 
 102.  Id. at 72. 
 103.  Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 127 (H.H. 
Gerth & C. Wright Mills, eds. 1958). 
